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We analyze a model with two software ﬁrms, quality improving
coding expenditures and potential competition. The ﬁrms can publish
parts of their software as open source which implies positive spillovers
and thus reduces the ﬁrms’ coding costs. On the other hand there exist
two negative eﬀects. First, lower coding costs induce higher coding
expenditures which decreases the ﬁrms’ proﬁts if their programs are
substitutes. Second, open source encourages entry and increases the
expenditures required to deter entry. The ﬁrms’ optimal open source
decisions balance these opposite eﬀects.
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11 Introduction
Open source software (OSS), such as the Linux operating system or the
Apache web server have recently found increasing interest in the software
industry as well as in the economic research community. OSS is software, of
which the source code (i.e. the code instructions showing how the software
works) is published and thus ”made open”. In contrast, most software today
is only available in binary code, which hides the way the program works.1
Typically, the source code of OSS can be accessed free of charge and com-
piled into a binary program, which can be executed on computers. However,
OSS is not free in the sense of ”you can do with it what you want”. Rather,
it is protected by copyright just like all other forms of software. Its usage re-
quires acceptance of and adherence to the terms of the licence under which it
has been published. Often, these licenses pose certain conditions upon some
usage forms, such as altering the program or integrating it with other appli-
cations. Nevertheless, OSS code is free for everyone to inspect and to derive
from this inspection how the programmer has solved certain problems.2
While the existence of OSS seems to be a puzzle as the incentives to write
a program which is then made available free of charge should be very low,
OSS is nevertheless continuously developed and supported by individual
programmers, academic research groups as well as ﬁrms. The Linux oper-
ating system, for example, was initiated by Linus Torvalds a student who
was dissatisﬁed with the Windows operating system. The Apache web server
goes back to the HTTPd project of the National Center for Supercomput-
ing Applications (NCSA) (see v. Hippel/v. Krog (2003) and Raymond (2000,
Chapter 5) for overviews; Lerner/Tirole (2002) and Bessen (2002) explain
individual contributions by labor market considerations and by the need to
adapt OSS for individual purposes). However, a large part of OSS is due
to the engagements of commercial ﬁrms. The survey of Ghosh et al. (2002)
indicates that 16% of the programmers developing OSS were paid directly
1Just like Coca-Cola does not publish its recipe on its bottles.
2This short description only describes coarsely what OSS is. There are many variants
of OSS as well as more extensive concepts like free software. A short introduction to the
diﬀerent issues can be found in Wichmann/Spiller (2002), Fink (2003) and Marx (2003).
2for this tasks. For another 13% the development of OSS is part of their
work. The contributions of these programmers are thus the result of ﬁrms’
deliberate decisions to ﬁnance the development of OSS. In addition there
exist several examples of companies that have made available formerly pro-
prietary software as open source software. One of the best known example is
Netscape, which made the source code for its browser available as OSS. The
browser Mozilla has developed out of this project. Another famous example
is Sun, which has published the source code to its oﬃce suite StarOﬃce
leading to the open source suite OpenOﬃce.
Despite these considerable activities the companies’ motivations behind their
OS engagement seems to be not as well understood as the motivation of
individual developers. Discussed in passing by Lerner/Tirole (2002a) and
Schmidt/Schnitzer (2002) explain ﬁrms’ OS activities by positive eﬀects
from selling complementary goods. Firms give away their software for free in
order to sell more of a complementary good, i.e., hardware or other software
programs.
But since open source software is available to everyone, the OSS activities
seem to resemble much more the ﬁrms’ engagements in basic research or in
standardization activities (see Lerner/Tirole (2002b) or Wichmann (2002)).
Making the source code of a program publicly available enables educated
users to ﬁnd ﬂaws and errors in the code and thus increases the quality
of the software. ”Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow” (Raymond,
1998) is a mantra of the open source community. Additionally, relying on
OSS software like the Linux operating system or the Apache web server
allows ﬁrms to beneﬁt from new programming solutions and to incorporate
new developments while keeping their own coding expenditures low.
These considerations form the starting point of our paper. We focus on
spillover eﬀects and discuss a simple model in which two ﬁrms selling soft-
ware products to consumers can publish parts of their software as OSS which
in turn can be used, modiﬁed and distributed by consumers or other ﬁrms.3
3Essentially, we assume that OSS is published under a rather liberal license. Several OS
license types are very close to our ideal scenario, e.g. BSD-type licenses (governing Apache
or the FreeBSD Unix) or the Artistic License (governing the programming language Perl).
See Lerner/Tirole (2002b) for a comparison of the relative importance of the diﬀerent
3Publishing OSS implies positive spillover eﬀects and thus reduces the ﬁrms’
coding costs by inducing other programmers to inspect, to debug and to
improve the published programs. However, we also consider two negative ef-
fects. First, lower coding costs may lead to more intense competition between
the ﬁrms which may induce higher coding expenditures. This eﬀect occurs
if from the consumers’ perspective the ﬁrms’ commercial software programs
are substitutes. Second, given presumably low entry costs in the software in-
dustry we explicitly consider the consequences of OSS for potential market
entry.4 Since entrants can build their own software on the published soft-
ware components OSS facilitates entry. To deter entry the incumbent ﬁrms
must increase their own coding investments the more the more OSS they
publish. We analyze the interaction of these diﬀerent eﬀects and show that
ﬁrms publish parts of their software as OSS even if this induces more intense
competition and even if market entry is encouraged. Furthermore, we show
that open source decisions can be interpreted as either strategic substitutes
or complements depending on whether the ﬁrms’ programs are substitutes
or complements.
Focusing on spillover eﬀects and the voluntary decisions of ﬁrms to publish
their software our approach is in line with the recent literature on R&D
expenditures and endogenously determined spillover eﬀects. Most notably,
Katsoulacos/Ulph (1998) and Kamien/Zang (2000) assume that ﬁrms can
choose the level of spillover eﬀects by selecting their research designs and/or
by deciding on sharing their research results with their rivals. While both
papers show that ﬁrms may have an incentive to deliberately allow for
spillover eﬀects, Katsoulacos/Ulph argue that this will only occur if each
ﬁrm’s proﬁt is increasing with the knowledge acquired by the other ﬁrms. In
Kamien/Zang the occurrence of spillovers is due to the assumption that in
order to be able to use research results generated by other ﬁrms each ﬁrm
must design its own research project such that spillover eﬀects can occur. In
our model, publishing OSS is necessary to induce contributions from third
types of OS licenses.
4A recent example for market entry is the newly proposed Linux distribution project
UserLinux (http://www.userlinux.com/) which was initiated by Bruce Perens to compete
with other commercial distributors like SuSE and Red Hat.
4parties. The induced spillover eﬀects accrue to all ﬁrms irrespective of their
own decisions to publish OSS. Furthermore, while both Katsoulacos/Ulph
and Kamien/Zang focus on the welfare eﬀects of research joint ventures they
do not consider potential entry. We argue that voluntarily induced spillover
eﬀects (which are positively correlated with the number of software pro-
grams the ﬁrms publish as OSS) are limited by the ﬁrms’ need to deter
entry. This result is also in contrast to Saint-Paul (2003) who focuses on
cumulative innovations and shows that ﬁrms can proﬁt from revealing all
of their research by inducing faster technological progress and thus higher
expected proﬁts.
In the next section we set out our model. Section 3 considers the optimal
open source decisions. Solving the model we ﬁrst present an overview of the
economic eﬀects, which determine the solution of the model. With respect
to the formal solutions we do not provide a detailed discussion; rather, we
try to illustrate the main results graphically. In section 4 we provide a short
summary.
2 The Model
We consider a four stage game with initially two ﬁrms i = 1;2 and potential
market entry. We start by explaining the timing of our model and then turn
to the speciﬁc assumptions on costs and demand.
Timing Two ﬁrms i = 1;2 oﬀer diﬀerent software programs composed by
a variety of components. In the ﬁrst stage each ﬁrm decides, which of these
components it publishes as open source software. In the second stage the
ﬁrms choose their coding expenditures in order to develop the qualities q1
and q2 of their software programs. Market entry takes place in the third
stage. In our model entrants can beneﬁt from the open source components
revealed by ﬁrms 1 and 2. We restrict entry such that for every market there
is one potential entrant ei = 1;2. Finally, the two ﬁrms 1 and 2 and any
actual entrant set their prices. Summarizing, we have:
t0 : Firms 1; 2 decide on their open source components.
t1 : Firms 1; 2 decide on their qualities q1 and q2:
5t2 : Entrants decide whether to enter or not and on their qualities qei.
t3 : All ﬁrms set their prices, demand and proﬁts are realized.
Costs Both ﬁrms can not only decide how much they spend on coding, i.e.,
on developing their software programs, they can also decide which of their
software components they publish as open source programs. To simplify the
analysis of these decisions we use the following reduced form approach: We
assume that the quality qi of ﬁrm i’s software program also measures the
software components needed for this program. With ®i 2 [0;1] denoting the
fraction of open source components that each ﬁrm publishes, the ﬁrms’ costs
for developing a quality qi are given by (i;j = 1;2; i 6= j)
ci(qi;qj;®i;®j) =
1
2 + ®iqi + ®jqj
q2
i : (1)
Due to higher coding necessities the ﬁrms’ costs are increasing in the quality
of their programs. Costs are decreasing in the fraction of the ﬁrms’ open
source components due to bug ﬁxing and improvements of these components
by users. Finally, the costs of ﬁrm i also decrease with ®jqj as it can use
and learn from the OSS components of its competitor.
Turning to the costs of potential entrants we have to take into account that
market entry takes place in stage 3. Hence, entrants can use the open source
components that ﬁrms 1 and 2 have made public to create a software clone
for each market at lower costs than the incumbent ﬁrms. The costs of an
entrant in market i are given by
cei(qei;qi;qj;®i;®j) =
1
2 + ®iqi + ®jqj
(qei ¡ ®iqi)2 for qei ¸ ®iqi (2)
where qei denotes the quality of the entrant’s software program.
Demand Generally, we assume that the demand for each ﬁrm’s program is
increasing in it’s quality but decreasing it’s price. Furthermore, the ﬁrms’
programs can be either substitutes or complements. Neglecting entry and
the availability of OSS and denoting the price of ﬁrm’s i program by pi, the
demand DM
i (pi;pj;qi;qj;¯) for program i is given by
DM






















6While ¯ < 0 implies that the programs are substitutes, the programs are
complements if ¯ > 0. The factor 1/(1 + ¯) normalizes aggregate demand
such that the sum of D1 and D2 only depends on qualities and on prices but
not on the magnitude of ¯.
Since ﬁrms may publish software components as open source and since en-
trants may oﬀer programs with qualities qe1 and qe2, we have to modify (3)
in order to derive the demand functions of the ﬁrms in the case of open
source or entry. With respect to the ﬁrst point note that the qualities of the
open source components are given by ®1q1 and ®2q2 and that their prices
are equal to zero. Concerning market entry, assume that entry has taken
place and that entrants oﬀer programs with qualities qei and prices pei.
We assume that the consumers’ decisions to either buy qi, to buy qei or sim-
ply to use the open source components can be traced back to a comparison
of the consumers’ rents as implied by (3). The alternative that yields the
highest consumer rent will be chosen. Using the assumption that DM
i (¢) is
linear in prices, we get the following demand functions Di(¢) and Dei(¢) for
the ﬁrms i = 1;2 and for the entrants ei (formally, Di(¢) and Dei(¢) depend






qi ¡ pi + ¯Θj
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if pi · pi
0 else
(4)

























£pqei ¡ pei + ¯Θj
¤
if pei < pei
0 else
(5)














Having speciﬁed the ﬁrms’ costs and their demand functions we now turn
to the solution of the game, which is solved by backward induction.
3 Optimal Open Source Decisions
Before we analyze the various stages of the game in more detail let us brieﬂy
summarize the main eﬀects which determine the solution of the model. The
7basic incentives for ﬁrms 1 and 2 to publish software components as open
source are due to the induced reductions of their own coding costs. How-
ever, as consumers might be satisﬁed by using the open source components,
going open source implies that the consumers’ reservation prices for the
(commercial) software programs decrease. Moreover, it also leads to pos-
itive spillover eﬀects with respect to the other ﬁrms’ costs. Open source
thus strengthens the ﬁrms’ incentives to develop higher qualities and—more
important—encourages market entry.
We ﬁrst discuss how these eﬀects interact and how they aﬀect the ﬁrms’
open source decisions. We then turn to the formal analysis of the model
where we skip most of the details. Rather, we illustrate the main results
graphically.
3.1 Entry Deterrence and Strategic Interdependencies
Potential entry combined with Bertrand competition on the last stage of
the game implies that deterrence of (proﬁtable) entry is optimal for ﬁrms
1 and 2.5 Entry deterrence is feasible since the reservation prices pei of the
entrants’ demands decrease with the qualities q1 and q2, respectively (see
(5)). Additionally, the entrants’ costs increase with their qualities pei. Thus,
by choosing relatively high qualities q1 and q2 ﬁrms 1 and 2 can eﬀectively
deter entry. Note, however, that due to the positive spillover eﬀects of OSS
the entry deterring qualities are higher, the higher the number of software
components the ﬁrms publish as open source.
Solving the model it turns out that the ﬁrms’ open source decisions are in
fact such that the ﬁrms are forced to choose entry deterring qualities. Hence,
the optimal open source decisions of ﬁrms 1 and 2 balance the positive
eﬀects due to cost reductions and the negative eﬀects due to the tightened
restriction with respect to entry deterrence.
In order to characterize the strategic interdependence between the ﬁrms’
open source decisions note that—neglecting positive spillovers due to open
source—the ﬁrms’ qualities are strategic substitutes (complements) if their
5This is simply due to the fact that entry in market i can be proﬁtable iﬀ qei > qi
which in turn leads to pi = 0.
8programs are substitutes (complements), i.e., if ¯ < 0 (¯ > 0). Combin-
ing this observation with the result that the entry deterring qualities in-
crease with the number of software components published as open source, the
strategic properties of the ﬁrms’ open source decisions resemble the strate-
gic properties of their quality decisions. If the ﬁrms’ programs are substi-
tutes their open source decisions tend to be strategic substitutes: The ﬁrms’
marginal proﬁts from increasing their own qualities are lower the higher the
quality of the other ﬁrm. Since each ﬁrm’s (entry deterring) quality increases
with it’s level of open source, the ﬁrms’ incentives to provide open source
are lower the more open source components the other ﬁrm publishes. On the
other hand, with complementary programs the ﬁrms’ open source decisions
are strategic complements. The ﬁrms’ marginal proﬁts from increasing their
own qualities are higher the higher the other ﬁrm’s quality. Thus, the ﬁrms’
incentives to provide open source increase with the other ﬁrm’s open source
level. In other words, with complements open source serves as a commitment
device for choosing high qualities.
3.2 The Price Subgame
Turning to a more detailed analysis consider ﬁrst the last stage of the game
in which ﬁrms set their prices. Combining revenues and costs yields the
following proﬁt functions ¼i(¢) and ¼ei(¢) for the ﬁrms 1 and 2 and for the
entrants e1 and e2:6
¼i(¢) = pi(¢)Di(¢) ¡ ci(¢) and ¼ei(¢) = peiDei(¢) ¡ cei(¢): (6)
Considering the optimal prices of ﬁrm i and of entrant ei, using (4) and
(5) and maximizing ¼i(¢) and ¼ei(¢) with respect to pi and pei, respectively,





















6To shorten the notation we often omit the arguments of the functions. Clearly, the
ﬁrms’ as well as the entrants’ proﬁts depend on all prices, on all qualities, on the ﬁrms’
open source decisions ®i with i = 1;2 as well as on ¯.
9Using ¡0:5 < ¯ < 0:5 and (7) shows that there exists a unique price equi-
librium in pure strategies. The equilibrium prices p¤
i(¢) and pe¤
i (¢) on both
markets are characterized in the following
Result 1 The equilibrium prices p¤
i(¢) and pe¤





















































Proof With ¡0:5 < ¯ < 0:5 and (7) we get ¡1 < @pr




@pj < 1. These properties guarantee the existence of a unique




Result 1 reveals p¤
ei(¢) > p¤
i(¢) = 0 iﬀ qei > qi. That is, entry can be proﬁtable
iﬀ the entrant’s quality is higher than the quality qi. Vice versa, if entry
occurs with qei > qi ﬁrm i will incur losses, which immediately implies that
entry deterrence is optimal for ﬁrm i.
Furthermore, even without entry, i.e., even in a situation with qe1 = qe2 = 0,
the equilibrium prices of ﬁrms 1 and 2 can be restricted by the consumers’
alternative to use the open source components. Using qe1 = qe2 = 0 to























®iqi tends to be more severe, the
larger ¯, i.e., the higher the complementary between the ﬁrms’ programs.




i (¢) only depend on the qualities qi and
q
e
i with i = 1;2.





103.3 Market Entry and Entry Deterrence
Although it turns out that the ﬁrms 1 and 2 will deter entry, we have to
specify the entrants’ optimal quality decisions. Using these qualities yields
the entrants’ reduced proﬁt functions, which indicate whether entry is prof-
itable or not. Thus, we ﬁrst characterize the equilibria in the entry game.
We also introduce an equilibrium selection criterion and we show that entry
deterrence is proﬁtable for ﬁrms 1 and 2 as long as the number of software
components published as open source is not too high.
Since proﬁtable entry requires qei > qi, the entrants’ equilibrium prices p¤
ei(¢)






the corner solution p¤
ei(¢) = pqei ¡
p
qi. Considering the solution of the
complete game we ﬁnd that the quality decisions of ﬁrms 1 and 2 as well








.9 We therefore restrict the following analysis to the
case in which p¤
ei(¢) = pqei ¡
p
qi holds.






qi, the reduced proﬁt function ¼¤
ei(¢) of













qi + ¯Ψi] ¡
(qei ¡ ®iqi)2
2 + ®iqi + ®jqj
(11)











if qej = 0
pqj if qej ¸ qj :
Diﬀerentiating (11) with respect to qei leads to the following ﬁrst order











qi + ¯Ψi] ¡
2(qei ¡ ®iqi)






qei = 0: (13)




ei < 0, (12) and (13) implicitly deﬁne the en-
trants’ optimal quality e qr
ei(qi;¢) ¸ qi. Taking into account that the entrant’s
9This result is due to the fact that—in order to deter entry—ﬁrms 1 and 2 will choose
relatively high quailities q1 and q2. Since the entrants’ costs are strictly convex in qei,








11proﬁt must be positive, we can specify the entrant’s proﬁt maximizing qual-
ity qr
ei(¢) as (note that qr










Considering entry in both markets (11) and (14) reveal that the entrants’
reduced proﬁts and hence their optimal quality decisions qr
ei(¢) depend on
whether entry in the other market has taken place or not. With ¯ < 0, i.e.,
with software programs that are substitutes, ¼¤
ei(¢) decreases if entry occurs
in market j. With complementary software programs entry in market i is
more proﬁtable if entry takes also place in market j. Therefore, the entry
game may have multiple equilibria.



















































@qej = 0, i.e., given that entry takes place in both
markets the entrants’ optimal qualities do not depend on each other. There-
fore, the solutions of equation (15) fully characterize all possible equilibria. ¥
Using result 2 we could turn to the next stage of the game, i.e., the spec-
iﬁcation of the quality decisions of ﬁrms 1 and 2. However, considering all





qej>qj > qi ^ qr
ei(¢)
¯ ¯
qej=0 = 0 ) q¤
ei(¢) = q¤
ej(¢) = 0: A
That is, we assume that the entrants can not coordinate their decisions such
that they both enter even if entry in each single market yields negative
proﬁts.
12Taking into account that entry deterrence is optimal for ﬁrms 1 and 2,
(A) does not restrict the analysis if ¯ · 0 holds. Entry in both markets
is deterred as long as entry in each single market is not proﬁtable. (A)
implies that the same result holds for ¯ > 0. Furthermore, analyzing the
(entry deterring) quality decisions of ﬁrms 1 and 2, we can concentrate on




qej=0 = 0 holds for both entrants the ﬁrms’ qualities q1 and q2
are such that entry in neither market occurs.




qej=0 and let us
also consider the proﬁt ¼r




and qej = 0 (p¤
i(¢) is deﬁned in (8)):
¼r
i(qi;qj;®i;®j;¯) := p¤
i(¢)Di(¢) ¡ ci(¢) with qei = qr
ei(¢)
¯ ¯



































qej=0 = 0 > qi.
(17)
With moderate open source decisions, i.e., with ®i;®j < 0:375, there exists
a quality qd















> 0 and (19)
¼r
i(qd
i (¢);qj;¢) > 0. (20)








@®j with qej = 0
can be determined by using the envelope theorem. Restricting the analysis





for qi = 0 and limqi!1 ¼¤












is strictly concave in qi which also implies qd
i (¢)
±
@®i > 0. Evaluating
13¼r
i(qd
i (¢);qj;®i;®j;¯) for all ®i;®j < 0:375 and ¯ 2 [¡0:5;0:5] conﬁrms
¼r
i(qd
i (¢);qj;®i;®j;¯) > 0. ¥
Positive spillover eﬀects due to open source imply that the entrants’ proﬁts
are higher, the more software components ﬁrms 1 and 2 have published as




decrease in qi but their costs are strictly convex in their qualities qei. Hence,
moderate open source decisions imply that entry in market i can be deterred
if the ﬁrms’ qualities qi are high enough. Furthermore, the entry deterring
qualities qd
i (qj;®i;®j;¯) increase in ®i and entry deterrence is proﬁtable as
long as the number of software components published as open source is not
too high.
3.4 Quality Decisions of Firms 1 and 2
Turning to the quality decisions of ﬁrms i = 1;2 we already know that the
ﬁrms’ quality decisions must be such that entry in their own markets does
not take place. We can also restrict the analysis to the range of open source
decisions, in which entry deterrence is feasible and proﬁtable.
Employing (A) we determine the equilibrium qualities of ﬁrms 1 and
2 by the following procedure: Using the reduced proﬁt function of ﬁrm
i given that entry can only occur in market i, i.e., using ¼r
i(qi;¢) (see
(16)), assume that maximizing ¼r
i(qi;¢) with respect to qi leads to a
unique solution qr
i(qj;¢). Assume further that qr
1(q2;¢) and qr
2(q1;¢) have a
unique ﬁxed point (q¤
1(®1;®2;¯);q¤
2(®2;®1;¯)). If neither ﬁrm has an in-
centive to deviate from q¤
i (¢) in order to induce entry in the other market,
(q¤
1(®1;®2;¯);q¤
2(®2;®1;¯)) also constitutes a pure strategy equilibrium of
the complete game in which entry in both markets is possible.











i (qj;®i;®j;¯)) = 0 and qi ¸ qd
i (qj;®i;®j;¯): (21)
With (21) the optimal quality qr
i(qj;¢) is either determined by the interior so-
lution, i.e., by the quality that maximizes the ﬁrm’s proﬁt if entry deterrence
14is not binding, or by the entry deterring quality qr
i(qj;¢) = qd
i (qj;®i;®j;¯).








> 0 for qr
i(qj;¢) ¸ qd
i (qj;®i;®j;¯): (22)
That is, an increase in the number of software components the ﬁrms publish
as open source reduces the ﬁrms’ costs and thus increases their optimal
qualities. Figure 1 shows qr
i(qj;¢) for ¯ = ¡0:25. The left picture is based
on ®1 = ®2 = 0 which leads qr
i(qj;¢) > qd
i (qj;¢). The right picture shows
qr
i(qj;¢) = qd
i (qj;¢) for ®1 = ®2 = 0:2. It also depicts the ﬁrm’s optimal
quality e qr
i(qj;¢) if entry is disregarded.
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Figure 1: Firm i’s optimal quality qr
i(qj;¢) with ¯ = ¡0:25; ®1 = ®2 = 0 and
®1 = ®2 = 0:2.
Figure 2 depicts qr
i(qj;¢) for ¯ = 0:25. Again, ®1 = ®2 = 0 leads to qr
i(qj;¢) >
qd
i (qj;¢) (see the left picture of Figure 2). With ®1 = ®2 = 0:2 we get
qr
i(qj;¢) = qd
i (qj;¢) (see the right picture of ﬁgure 2).
Turning to the equilibrium qualities of ﬁrms 1 and 2, inspection of
qr
1(q2;¢) and qr
2(q1;¢) yields that there exists a unique ﬁxed point
(q¤
1(®1;®2;¯);(q¤
2(®2;®1;¯)). To verify that (q¤
1(®1;®2;¯);(q¤
2(®2;®1;¯)) is
a pure strategy equilibrium of the complete game, in which entry in both
markets is possible, we additionally have to show that any deviation from
q¤
i (®i;®j;¯), which would induce entry into market j, is not proﬁtable. En-
try in market j would occur with qej > qj and would furthermore lead to
p¤
ej(¢) = pqej ¡pqj. With ¯ < 0, i.e., with software programs that are sub-
stitutes, a higher quality in market j decreases the proﬁt of ﬁrm i. On the
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Figure 2: Firm i’s optimal quality qr
i(qj;¢) with ¯ = 0:25; ®1 = ®2 = 0 and
®1 = ®2 = 0:2.
other hand, with ¯ > 0 entry in market j would not only increase the proﬁt
of ﬁrm i but would also make entry in market i more proﬁtable. Hence,
inducing entry in market j would force ﬁrm i to increase qi in order to deter
entry in its own market. Evaluating these eﬀects shows that any deviation
from q¤
i (®1;®2;¯) decreases ﬁrm i’s proﬁt.
Summarizing and using (22) we obtain
Result 4 If the ﬁrms’ open source decisions are such that entry deterrence
is proﬁtable, there exists a unique pure strategy equilibrium with qualities
q¤
i (®i;®j;¯) which obey @q¤
i (¢)/@®i > 0:
To analyze q¤
i (®i;®j;¯) further and to specify whether the ﬁrms’ qualities are
determined by entry deterrence let us start with ®1 = ®2 = 0. Calculating
q¤
i (0i;0;¯) for all ¯ 2 [¡0:5;0:5] we ﬁnd that the equilibrium qualities do
not induce entry, i.e., we have
q¤






8 ¯ 2 [¡0:5;0:5] : (23)
Since open source decreases the entrants’ costs, it turns out that there exists
a critical level of ®d















16which implies that ®d
i(®;¯) = ® has a unique solution ®d(¯). Figure 3 shows
the graphs of ®d(¯) and the corresponding qualities q¤
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with ®1 = ®2 = ®d(¯).
3.5 Open Source Decisions
Finally, using the equilibrium qualities q¤
i (®i;®j;¯) let ¼¤¤
i (®i;®j;¯) denote
the ﬁrms’ reduced proﬁt functions. The ﬁrms’ proﬁt maximizing open source






Evaluating (24) yields ®r
i(®j;¯) > ®j for all ®j · ®d(¯). Conﬁning the
analysis to ®i;®j > ®d(¯) shows that ¼¤¤
i (®i;®j;¯) has a unique maximum
in ®i. Hence, ®r
i(®j;¯) is uniquely deﬁned for ®j > ®d(¯). Figure 4 depicts
®r
i(®j;¯) for ¯ = ¡0:25 and ¯ = 0:25.
A more careful analysis of the ﬁrms’ mutual best responses shows that
®r
1(®2;¯) and ®r
2(®1;¯) have a unique ﬁxed point. Therefore, we get






2(¯) > ®d(¯): (25)
Figure 5 shows the graph of ®¤(¯).
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Figure 4: Firm i’s optimal open source decision ®r
i(®j;¯) for ¯ = ¡0:25 and
¯ = 0:25.
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Figure 5: Equilibrium open source decisions ®¤(¯).
The kink at ¯1 = 0:263 is due to the fact that the ﬁrms’ equilibrium prices
p¤


















j(¢) for ¯ ¸ ¯1 :
With software programs that are relatively strong complements the ﬁrms’
open source decisions do not only force them to choose entry deterring qual-
ities. They also imply that the ﬁrms’ prices are bounded by consumers’
alternative to use the open source software instead of buying the ﬁrms’
(commercial) software programs.
While ﬁgures 4 already indicates that the ﬁrms’ open source decisions tend
to be strategic substitutes (complements) if their programs are substitutes
18(complements), we now analyze this strategic interdependence more care-
fully. For this purpose it suﬃces to consider the open source decisions that







Comparing ®C(¯) with ®¤(¯) (see Figure 6) we ﬁnd that as long as the
programs are strong substitutes, i.e., as long as ¯ < ¡0:11 holds, the joint
proﬁt maximization open source decision is lower than ®¤(¯). Thus, the
ﬁrms’ open source decisions are strategic substitutes for all ¯ < ¡0:11. For
¯ > ¡0:11 the ﬁrms’ open source decisions are strategic complements, i.e.,
®C(¯) > ®¤(¯).
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Figure 6: Equilibrium open source decisions ®¤(¯) and optimal cooperative
decisions ®C(¯).
Furthermore, with ¯ < ¯2 = ¡0:184 we have ®C(¯) = ®d(¯). That is,
while increasing ® above ®d(¯) would reduce the ﬁrms’ costs, the ﬁrms
would also be forced to increase their qualities in order to deter entry. With
software programs that are strong substitutes this second eﬀect is nega-
tive and dominates the positive eﬀects from cost reductions. On the other
hand, the higher ¯ the lower the negative eﬀects due to increased quali-
ties. Therefore, ®C(¯) > ®d(¯) and ®C0(¯) > 0 for all ¯ > ¯2. Note that
®C0(¯) > 0 also holds if the equilibrium prices are restricted by the con-








j(¢), we still have ®C0(¯) > 0.
194 Conclusion
We started with the assumption that open source reduces the coding costs
of software ﬁrms developing new or qualitatively enhanced programs. The
users’ incentives to detect bugs and the incentives of programmers to signal
their coding abilities by contributing to open source are two reasons why
software ﬁrms may beneﬁt from publishing parts of their software as open
source. Given these cost reducing eﬀects we analyzed how ﬁrms determine
the degree up to which they publish their software as open source. We set up
a model with only two ﬁrms and potential competition from new entrants.
Considering positive spillovers due to open source it turned out that the
ﬁrms’ open source decisions balance the positive eﬀects from cost reductions
and the negative eﬀects due to the tightened restrictions with respect to
entry deterrence. Furthermore, since consumers may use the open source
software instead of buying the commercial software programs, the ﬁrms’
prices can ultimately be bounded by the restriction that the demand for
their commercial programs is positive.
The strategic interdependence between the ﬁrms’ open source decisions is
determined by whether the ﬁrms’ programs are substitutes or complements.
Programs which are (strong) substitutes imply that the open source deci-
sions are strategic substitutes, complementary programs lead to open source
decisions which are strategic complements. This result is due to the fact that
the ﬁrms’ qualities increase in the number of software components they pub-
lish as open source. Therefore, the strategic interdependence between the
ﬁrms’ open source decisions mirrors the strategic interdependence between
the ﬁrms’ quality decisions.
These results show that not only the obvious technical eﬀects of open source
software (e.g. cost reductions) have to be taken into account when discussing
the decision of ﬁrms to publish some of the software they have developed
under an open source license. Rather, strategic considerations with respect
to actual and potential competitors aﬀect this decision as well.
The model presented in this paper can be enriched in at least two diﬀer-
ent ways. One aspect could be a more sophisticated modelling of the OSS
license. The license in the model is a very simple BSD-type license that ba-
20sically allows anyone to do with the open source software whatever he or she
wants, especially to integrate it into proprietary products. While many OSS
projects employ such licenses to speed up adoption (e.g. Apache), others
use stricter licenses such as the GNU Public License GPL (e.g. Linux). The
GPL demands that any software derived from GPLed software falls again
under the GPL and cannot be (tightly) integrated with proprietary software.
Extending the model to cover this type of license would therefore require
a more detailed speciﬁcation of the diﬀerent components and the decisions
about releasing and using these components under the GPL.
The eﬀect of stricter licenses on the quality of software is ambiguous. On the
one hand, a stricter license decreases the threat of entry from third parties
making use of the OSS. This would lead companies to publish a larger share
of their software as OSS to capture the associated beneﬁts which in turn
would increase the quality of the software. On the other hand, as the threat
of potential entry decreases also the incentives for improving the software
quality to keep potential entrants out of the market decrease.
A second possibility to augment the model is a more elaborated modelling of
the demand for OSS by consumers and companies. Such usage decisions are
typically very complex and depend not only on the price and quality of the
software. The already existing software (compatibility required) as well as
the users’ expectations of the future development are certainly two elements
which have to be taken into account. Including network externalities and
the observation that OSS can serve as a commitment device to ensure future
compatibility with other software programs could make the analysis more
appropriate. However, the basic tradeoﬀ between positive spillover eﬀects
and the negative eﬀects due to encouraged entry and the potential use of
only OSS components as analyzed in our model should even persist in a
richer modelling structure.
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